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Equity theory approaches justice evaluations based on ratios of exchange inputs to
exchange outcomes. Situations are evaluated as just if ratios are equal and unjust if
unequal. We suggest that equity ratios serve a more fundamental cognitive function
than the evaluation of justice. More particularly, we propose that they serve as causal
schemas for exchange outcomes, that is, they assist in determining whether certain
outcomes are caused by inputs of other people in the context of an exchange process.
Equality or inequality of ratios in this sense points to an exchange process. Indeed,
Study 1 shows that different exchange situations, such as disproportional or balanced
proportional situations, create perceptions of give-and-take on the basis of equity ratios.
Study 2 shows that perceptions of justice are based more on communicatively accepted
rules of interaction than equity-based evaluations, thereby offering a distinction between
an attribution and an evaluation cognitive process for exchange outcomes.
Keywords: social exchange, justice, equity, communicative rationality, psychological contract, attribution
INTRODUCTION
Equity theory was introduced in the study of organizational settings to examine justice in
the workplace environment (Adams, 1963), but was soon formulated as a general theory of
interpersonal relationships (Walster et al., 1973) that treats social interaction as an exchange of
resources among actors. It is part of a broader set of social exchange theories, which have been
extensively applied in understanding workplace behavior, although their concepts are not strictly
defined and articulated (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).
Equity theory specifically argues that resources should be used in a way so that inputs and
outcomes of an exchange process are proportional. In this sense, equity ratios (which can be
perceived as ratios of outcomes to inputs or vice versa) should be equal. The main reasoning behind
this is that rational people would accept no other arrangement in their effort to maximize outcomes
and manage their resources effectively (see Walster et al., 1973). In fact, equity theory is strongly
based on the instrumental rationality postulate and essentially argues that inputs and outcomes are
the main determinants of the evaluation process of an exchange as just or unjust.
It is not necessary, though, to view rationality only in terms of the effectiveness of goal-
directed actions and, therefore, the effective use of exchange participants’ resources; rationality
can be treated more broadly in terms of the ability of exchange participants to reach a common
understanding about their shared ‘lifeworld’ (see Habermas, 1985). In short, whatever brings about
an agreement that is communicatively achieved can serve as a criterion for the evaluation of an
exchange situation.
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In this sense, equity ratios may indeed include necessary
elements of any exchange process –inputs and outcomes– but
they do not have a hidden property of ‘compulsory’ equality. In
fact, they can be treated as cognitive elements of a causal schema
that processes how exchange outcomes are linked to exchange
inputs. This causal schema could be derived from an implicit
knowledge about the structure of the world, or more specifically
about the nature of social interaction (Kelley, 1973).
Our purpose is to examine whether equity ratios in essence
illustrate a relationship between cause and effect which is
necessary to the cognitive process of the attribution of exchange
outcomes, rather than to the cognitive process of the evaluation
of the exchange; the latter process would serve the purpose of
establishing the appropriate norm to the effected exchange and
would often go beyond equity considerations. We will further
examine, consistent with the communicative rationality view of
Habermas (1985), whether justice is evaluated in terms of the
rules that can elicit agreement of exchange participants.
Equity Ratios and Attribution of
Outcomes
Attribution theory is concerned with the way in which people
answer causal questions, i.e., questions beginning with ‘why.’
Originating in Heider’s conception of people as causal ‘origins’
(Heider, 1944), attribution theory has offered valuable insight
into how people are able to attribute actions to internal
dispositions of actors (Jones and Davis, 1965) or derive their
own attitudes from observing their own actions (Bem, 1967).
Research in this field has remained diverse and its boundaries
have never really been formalized (Weiner, 2008). Few in this
field, however, would argue against Heider (1958) who treated
people as naive scientists that adopt principles to produce cause-
effect relationships in a similar manner that a scientific system
is formulated. At the same time it is accepted that on a more
practical level, people often employ causal schemas, that is,
abstract ideas about the nature of causal factors, since they lack
the motivation, the time, or the knowledge to make proper
scientific evaluations (Kelley, 1973).
Our research is not the first to examine equity and attribution
with regard to exchange outcomes. Hegtvedt et al. (1993) studied
the ways in which perceived equity was associated with the
attribution of outcomes to the self or the other. They found that
the greater the perception of equity, the greater the attribution of
outcomes to the self. However, they did not propose a cognitive
mechanism for how equity is linked to the attributions, or when
people view such a situation as an exchange. To our knowledge,
there has been no explicit reference regarding if and how equity
ratios can be considered causal schemas for exchange outcomes.
In a two–party interaction between A and B, one way the
equity postulate can be portrayed is the following:
Outcomes A
Inputs A
=Outcomes B
Inputs B
One of the problems that have been identified in equity theory
is that inputs and outcomes are often difficult to distinguish
empirically (Cook and Parcel, 1977). Our proposal is to treat
equity theory ratios as causal schemas where inputs are causes
and outcomes are effects. A’s and B’s actions (inputs) can influence
both actors’ outcomes (see Figure 1, where causal relationships
are illustrated by the use of arrows). If there is no other factor
(such as other actors, chance etc.) that influences the actors’
outcomes, any disproportionality in inputs and outcomes of one
actor first of all implies that one actor has influenced the other.
If we limit our analysis to positive influence, i.e., the use of
positive resources, an unfavorable disproportionality to A (A’s
outcomes/A’s inputs< B’s outcomes/B’s inputs) means that A has
used resources in favor of B’s outcomes. In this sense A has ‘given,’
B has ‘received’ and an exchange has taken place. Perceptions of
‘receiving’ essentially describe a cause-effect relationship between
one’s outcome and another person’s input and are the result of the
attribution process of one’s outcome to another person’s input.
The above reasoning may be clarified through an example.
Let us for a moment assume that there is no exchange and A
performs a simple goal-directed action: She is making pancakes.
Inputs include her effort, the cost of the ingredients, and the use
of the oven, while the outcome includes the quality and quantity
of the pancakes that A consumes. Without B, outcomes can only
be attributed to A’s inputs (illustrated by the arrow from A’s inputs
to A’s outcomes, in Figure 1). Now, if B comes into the picture, he
may eat part of the pancakes without offering any input or very
little. This is an example of a disproportional situation, where
B receives from A (illustrated by the arrow from A’s inputs to
B’s outcomes), since the pancakes he eats are attributed to A’s
inputs. The less inputs B provides and the more outcomes he
reaps, the greatest the disproportionality and the perception of
B’s receiving. On the other hand, B can sit in the same kitchen,
make his own pancakes and consume only the pancakes he made
(illustrated by the arrow from B’s inputs to B’s outcomes). In this
case, the outcomes of A can only be attributed to the inputs of
A and the outcomes of B to the inputs of B. This would be a
proportional situation where no real exchange has taken place.
B can also share his ingredients with A, collaborate with A and
in the end share the pancakes in a proportional manner. From
the bulk of pancakes that both A and B made, we can attribute
the existence of some pancakes to A and some to B, depending
on the amount of their inputs, and deduce who has received
from the other or, in general, whether an exchange has taken
place.
The causal schema for a high outcome for A may be
depicted in the more familiar form of a compensatory cause
schema (Kelley, 1972, 1973), where two quantitatively graded
causes contribute to the effect (Figure 2). The inputs of A
and B contribute to the final high outcome of A. However,
only when the input of B is low can we deduce that the
cause of the high outcome for A is A’s high input (indicated
by the solid arrow). In the cases of high or medium input
of B, one cannot easily infer the extent that the input of
A contributed to the final high outcome (indicated by the
dotted arrows). Unless, that is, one knows more about the
outcome of B. The case of exchange is too complicated to
be depicted in a two-dimensional causal schema because it is
not only the inputs that are taken into account, but also the
outcomes of both parties. A straightforward way to portray this
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FIGURE 1 | The attribution of exchange outcomes in a two-party interaction.
FIGURE 2 | Causal schema for compensatory causes in the form of Kelley (1973). (E = high outcomes for A).
type of schema is to resort to Figure 1 or the equity ratios
themselves.
It is also important to note that the current analysis is
presented with slight but important differences compared to
mainstream attribution analyses. Most psychological research is
based on the dichotomy between internal and external attribution
(Hewstone, 1989), often failing to distinguish among the different
social objects: task, self, other, social unit (Lawler, 2001). The
social unit can be an exchange relationship, a network, or
group. Indeed an exchange relationship may offer an attractive
explanation for an outcome (Eberly et al., 2011). Understanding
how and when people attribute outcomes to the other person in
the context of an exchange relationship offers a more fine-grained
explanation than the one offered by the usual internal-external
dichotomy. Our reasoning and measures concerning attribution
have been developed mostly to reflect an inter-individual or
dyadic level of analysis (Krasikova and LeBreton, 2012; Tse and
Ashkanasy, 2015) than the usual intra-individual level of analysis
(for more about levels of analyses in social psychology see Doise,
1980).
On a dyadic level, interactions are often assumed to be
exchanges of resources such as love, information, or money
(Foa and Foa, 1974) but the case in which people actually
treat interactions as exchanges is rarely examined. Our proposed
approach rests on a fundamental assumption: People can attribute
outcomes to actions and to resources of their own and/or those of
other people. When they perceive that it is not only their own
actions or their own resources (their own inputs) that influence
their outcomes, they partly attribute their outcomes to the inputs
of other people. In this case, they perceive that they ‘receive.’
The ratios of equity theory implicitly point to an attribution
process, and yet have not been used and tested in such a way
explicitly. Proportionality or disproportionality (i.e., equal or
unequal ratios) may contribute to our understanding of how
individuals exchange resources once we take into account the
attribution process concerning resources and outcomes.
Should there be proportionality though (i.e., is proportionality
an imperative) as equity theory argues? The ‘ought’ element
is not an inherent property of equity theory ratios themselves.
With no other criterion to judge an interaction, the simplest
rule to use for evaluation would be that of “giving to every
man his own” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 96). However, the above-
mentioned rule of interaction may not be the only one
involved.
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Equity, Justice, and Agreement
Equity rules are but few of a broader set of possible distributional
rules that are used to evaluate justice. Concerning the final
distribution of outcomes, Deutsch (1975) argued that there are
eleven different allocation rules that may lead to a fair outcome.
These rules could be classified under three main categories: equity
rules, equality rules, and need-based rules. Therefore, a result
can be distributively fair if (a) outcomes are taken into account
and found equal, (b) inputs are also taken into account and
the ratios suggested by equity theory are found equal, or (c)
needs are added in the equation and satisfied in a proportional
manner. A different focus was introduced through Thibaut and
Walker’s (1975, 1978) seminal work on the control that the
disputants have on the legal procedure. Emphasis was placed
on the fairness of the procedure and not necessarily that of
the outcome and, thus, the concept of procedural justice was
distinguished clearly from the concept of distributive justice.
Another distinct concept is that of interactional justice (see
Bies and Moag, 1986) that focuses on the relationship of the
parties and not on the outcome or the procedure. More recently,
Folger (2001) argued in favor of the concept of deontic justice
since earlier conceptions “ignore principled moral obligations and
instead substitute personal desires as reasons for acting fairly
or responding negatively to injustice” (Cropanzano et al., 2003,
p. 1019).
So many are the possible rules and norms that are used to
evaluate justice that it seems legitimate to argue that any type of
rule can serve as a criterion for evaluating justice. For example,
disproportional outcomes may be judged fairer in the context
of positive relational ties (Sherf and Venkataramani, 2015) or
in case exchange participants are able to exercise autonomy in
their task decisions (Cropanzano and Folger, 1989). At the same
time, people may evaluate justice on the basis of the information
that they receive first (Van den Bos et al., 1997). Cross-
cultural considerations, such as individualism-collectivism, may
also play an important role in justice evaluations (Chen et al.,
1998).
Jasso (1980, 2005) goes beyond equity theory and offers
a comprehensive justice analysis on the basis of a referential
standard, the “just share,” which may be based on an aggregate
set of comparisons, comparison with a group, or comparison
with an abstract standard or principle. Hegtvedt and Johnson
(2000) point out that equity theory assumes a single rule as
legitimate without considering different aspects of legitimation.
According to them, justice research should focus less on
comparisons between the ratio of outcomes to inputs of
a person and the ratio of another person; it should focus
more on the person’s assessment of the fairness of that
ratio and what other people assess as fair. However, their
research does not necessarily reject the ‘instrumental rationality’
framework of classic equity theorists (see Hegtvedt et al.,
2003).
Habermas (1985) offers a conception of rationality, namely
communicative rationality, which is quite different to the self-
interested instrumental rationality that equity theory accepts.
In his work on morality (Habermas, 1991), he argues that
‘ought’ is established within reasoned discussion and by means
of agreement. The evaluation of rules, or normative rightness
in general, as well as the obligation to uphold rules can be
approached on the basis of the rules’ potential validity in
the context of reasoned discussion among members of an
exchange relationship. It is useful to point out that empirical
research can approach justice evaluations on the basis of
agreement among participants in a discussion (Kahn et al.,
1982). Heider (1958) also proposes that ‘ought’ is shared
by all people in a particular situation, has intersubjective
validity, and, moreover: “people should concur in its directives”
(Heider, 1958, p. 222). This type of intersubjective validity
often goes beyond the particular context, stands the test of
a universal audience (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958)
and is supported by reasons that establish the rightness
of norms during discourse (Habermas, 1991). Furthermore,
every negotiation regarding an exchange can be viewed as an
intersubjective process that validates the rights of negotiating
parties (Arvanitis and Karampatzos, 2013), through the central
role of agreement (Arvanitis, 2015). Therefore, inputs and
outcomes do not necessarily determine the way in which justice
is evaluated, since the evaluation is based on the rules that
elicit agreement during discourse (rules that can go beyond
equity).
The role of agreement has also been stressed in the
realms of another social exchange theory, psychological contract
theory (Rousseau, 1995). Psychological contract theory accepts
that it is agreement that creates obligations to uphold
certain norms, although people may fail to share the same
understanding concerning the terms of the exchange (Dabos
and Rousseau, 2004). In fact, psychological contract theory
primarily investigates divergence of beliefs concerning the
terms of interaction, studying, among others, how breach of
a psychological contract is associated with feelings of violation
(Robinson and Morrison, 2000). The appropriateness of a norm
regarding an exchange is often established on the basis of a
synthesis of different and contradicting perceptions. Habermas
(1985, 1991) argues that such synthesis is accomplished by means
of agreement during reasoned discussion.
Attribution and Evaluation in Exchange:
Two Distinct Cognitive Processes
Kelley and Michela (1980) made a crude distinction between
attribution and “attributional” research. Attribution research
examines or involves the manipulation of the antecedents of
attributions, but is not interested in consequences beyond the
attributions themselves. On the other hand, attributional research
focuses more on the consequences of attribution in areas such
as achievement or romantic love. What we find most interesting
about this distinction is the attempt to dissociate the qualities
of the attribution process itself from its consequences. This is
exactly what we intend to do in the context of this research.
Inputs and outcomes will initially be manipulated to understand
how they contribute to attributions of outcomes and further
evaluation will be treated as a separate cognitive process, an
“attributional” process regarding the evaluation of fairness. Our
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research relies on minimal context in order to examine basic
reasoning processes.
STUDY 1: WHEN DO PEOPLE PERCEIVE
A SITUATION AS EXCHANGE?
The primary purpose of Study 1 is to examine whether
people perceive each other’s influence as exchange, or more
simply put, as give-and-take. More specifically, we will examine
whether equity theory ratios accurately reflect the attribution of
outcomes and provide the basis of perceptions of receiving in
interdependent situations. We will further examine perceptions
of justice to see how people evaluate the situation, since equity
theory holds an eminent position in the justice literature.
However, we will not include any aspect of communication
between the hypothetical dyad of exchange participants.
Our general hypotheses concerning participants’ perceptions
in a two-party interaction are derived from a simple analysis
of Figure 1. Just by looking at the amount of inputs and
outcomes of A and B and without further knowledge of their
interaction (as well as the presence of any third factors) we
would hypothesize that counterparts will be perceived either to
have cooperated and proceeded with an exchange or to have
proceeded individually on their own if inputs and outcomes were
proportional. The case for cooperation would be more evident
in the case that A and B contributed equally and had an equal
share of the outcomes, because this type of situation would likely
be the product of some sort of intentional exchange between A
and B, instead of being some type of coincidence. The role of
intentions in attribution processes has been repeatedly stressed
in attribution theories, especially correspondent inference theory
(Jones and Davis, 1965). Otherwise, a disproportional situation
will lead to the perception (as long as a third factor is
non-existent) that A has received from B or the opposite.
Moreover, in the absence of any information concerning the
normative rightness of potential rules, proportional situations
will be perceived as fair, whereas disproportional situations as
unfair.
Therefore, in proportional situations, counterparts would
be perceived to receive equally from each other (Hypothesis
1A). As long as there is no other rule governing the
interaction, the situation will be deemed just in cases of
proportionality (Hypothesis 1B). In cases of disproportionality
though, one person will be perceived to receive from the other
in a way consistent with the direction and the size of the
disproportionality (Hypothesis 2A). As long as there is no other
rule governing the interaction, the situation will be deemed
unjust in cases of disproportionality (Hypothesis 2B).
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty four (18.52% males) undergraduate psychology
students voluntarily participated in this study. Participants
were between 18 and 25 years old with a mean age of
19.57 years old (SD = 1.07), all Caucasian. A 3 (balance
of outcomes: balanced–A = B, imbalanced favorable
to A–A > B, imbalanced favorable to B–A < B) × 3
(balance of inputs: balanced–A = B, imbalanced favorable
to A–A < B, imbalanced favorable to B–A > B) within-
subjects design was employed. The structure of the design
(depicted in Table 1) was such that three of the resultant
conditions exemplified proportionality (either balanced or
imbalanced with reference to A or B) and six exemplified
disproportionality (four reflected mild disproportionality due
to imbalance in inputs or outcomes, and two reflected strong
disproportionality).
Procedure and Materials
Participants were informed of the general purpose of the study
and gave written consent, in line with the WMA declaration of
Helsinki. No deception concerning the purpose of the study was
necessary. As the stories used in this study involved the evaluation
of hypothetical third-party interactions, we anticipated minimal
emotional involvement on the part of participants. The procedure
was approved by the supervisory committee of the Ph.D. thesis of
the first author. After completion, participants were thoroughly
debriefed and excused.
Participants were given a booklet containing nine short
hypothetical scenarios. The basic scenario depicted A and B as
business partners, and also presented their contribution to the
company and their share of the profits. The scenario simply
read “A and B are the sole partners in a company. The course
of the company is entirely in their hands. The contribution of
each to the company and the share of the profits of each are
as follows:” Two bar graphs followed that showed A’s and B’s
relative contribution to the company and their corresponding
share of profits. The stories were minimal and were pilot tested
in a small sample of university students to check comprehension
and potential involvement. A short introductory page stressed
that the information given would be limited, but encouraged
participants to imagine such exchange situations and estimate
the level of receiving for the hypothetical exchange dyad.
Nine variations of the same story – which appeared randomly
within a nine-page questionnaire – reflected the nine conditions
of proportionality and disproportionality (see Table 1). Each
scenario was followed by items designed to obtain measures
for receiving (two short straightforward items that tapped into
the perception of exchange abstractly: “I think that A ‘received’
from B,” “I think that B ‘received’ from A”) and one item to
measure a general sense of justice of the situation (“I think that
the situation is just”). Similar items were considered and dropped
after the pilot study, after exhibiting very high correlations with
the ones chosen, in an effort to minimize participant fatigue.
Participants used a 7-point scale to indicate their agreement or
disagreement with the items (7 for strong agreement, 1 for strong
disagreement).
Results
Receiving
We performed two separate analyses designed to test our
hypotheses concerning the effects of proportionality (Hypothesis
1A) and disproportionality (Hypothesis 2A) on perceptions of
receiving.
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B Proportionality
We performed a 3 (proportionality balance: balanced
proportionality- BP, imbalanced proportionality with reference to
A-IPa, imbalanced proportionality with reference to B-IPb) × 2
(receiving A vs. B: A’s receiving from B, B’s receiving from
A) within-subjects ANOVA (Table 2). The main effect for
‘receiving A vs. B’ [F(1,53) < 1] and the two-way interaction
were not significant [F(1,53) < 1], which indicates that there
was no difference between A’s receiving and B’s receiving, a
finding in support of Hypothesis 1A stating that in cases of
proportionality counterparts would be perceived to receive
equally from each other. However, there was a significant main
effect of proportionality balance, F(2,106) = 35.30, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.40; post hoc comparisons showed that perceptions of
receiving were significantly higher for Balanced Proportionality
(M = 4.98) than those for either condition of Imbalanced
Proportionality (M = 3.54, p < 0.001; M = 3.53, p < 0.001).
The difference between the latter IP conditions (IPa vs. IPb)
was on average not significant. In other words, participants
perceive that A and B receive from each other in BP whereas
they do not have the same conviction in IP situations. In fact,
one-sample t-tests revealed that the mean for BP (4.98) was
significantly higher (p < 0.001) than the midpoint of the scale
(4), indicating perceptions of receiving, while both means for
IP (3.54; 3.53) were significantly lower (p < 0.05) than the
midpoint of the scale (4), indicating that participants would
tend to disagree that A or B received from each other. In other
words, it can be argued that participants did not perceive the
situation as one of exchange in the IP situation. The present
findings allude to the fact that BP situations are perceived as
exchanges whereas IP situations may not even be perceived as
exchanges.
Disproportionality
Given our Hypothesis 2A that disproportionality (i.e., conditions
of either outcomes or inputs imbalance) lead to perceptions of
unequal receiving from each other, reflecting the direction and
the size of the disproportionality, it was thought most appropriate
to calculate difference scores (measures of A’s receiving from
B minus B’s receiving from A, for disproportionality favorable
to A, and vice versa for disproportionality favorable to B) as
more accurate reflections of who actually receives and to what
extent. We performed a 3 (level of disproportionality: Strong
Disproportionality-SD, Mild Disproportionality due to inputs-
MDi, Mild Disproportionality due to outcomes-MDo) × 2
(Disproportionality favorable to: A or B) within-subjects
ANOVA, on these difference scores (Table 3).
There was a main effect of level of disproportionality,
F(2,106) = 7.08, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12; post hoc comparisons
showed that perceptions of receiving were significantly higher
for SD (M = 3.88) than those for either the condition of
MD due to imbalance in inputs (M = 3.15, p < 0.001)
or the condition of MD due to imbalance in outcomes
(M = 2.97, p < 0.001)1. The difference between the latter
1Since we are dealing with difference scores based on 7-point scales (min = 0,
max= 6), the higher the score the stronger the perception that one party receives.
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TABLE 2 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of receiving in conditions of proportionality.
A’s receiving B’s receiving
BP IPa IPb BP IPa IPb
M 4.98 3.55 3.72 4.98 3.53 3.35
SD 1.13 1.12 1.34 1.27 1.10 1.36
BP, balanced proportionality; IPa, imbalanced proportionality with reference to A; IPb, imbalanced proportionality with reference to B.
TABLE 3 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of difference scores of receiving in conditions of disproportionality.
Disproportionality favorable to A Disproportionality favorable to B
SD MDi MDo SD MDi MDo
M 4.05 3.27 2.96 3.70 3.03 2.98
SD 2.26 2.14 2.30 2.43 2.45 2.61
SD, strong disproportionality; MDi, mild disproportionality due to imbalance in inputs; MDo, mild disproportionality due to imbalance in outcomes.
two conditions was not significant. This finding supports
Hypothesis 2A which states that in cases of disproportionality
parties are perceived to receive in a way consistent with the
direction and the size of the disproportionality since this
perception is stronger in conditions of SD than in conditions
of MD.
Justice of the Situation
We performed two separate analyses designed to test our
hypotheses concerning the effects of proportionality (Hypothesis
1B) and disproportionality (Hypothesis 2B) on perceptions of
justice.
Proportionality
A within-subjects one-way ANOVA (proportionality balance:
balanced proportionality-BP, imbalanced proportionality with
reference to A-IPa, imbalanced proportionality with reference
to B-IPb) was performed (Table 4). The effect of level
of proportionality on perceptions of justice was significant,
F(2,106) = 13.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.95. Perceptions of justice
were significantly higher in the condition of BP (p < 0.001),
than in either of the IP conditions, which did not differ
significantly. One-sample t-tests revealed that all three means
were significantly higher (p < 0.001) than the midpoint of
the scale (4) indicating strong perceptions of justice. These
findings are in line with Hypothesis 1B stating that in cases of
proportionality the situation will be deemed just; however, in BP
the situation is deemed more just than in IP.
TABLE 4 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of justice in conditions
of proportionality.
BP IPa IPb
M 6.51 5.55 5.44
SD 0.66 1.90 1.95
BP, balanced proportionality; IPa, imbalanced proportionality with reference to A;
IPb, imbalanced proportionality with reference to B.
Disproportionality
We performed a 3 (level of disproportionality: Strong
Disproportionality-SD, Mild Disproportionality due to inputs-
MDi, Mild Disproportionality due to outcomes-MDo) × 2
(Disproportionality favorable to: A or B) within-subjects
ANOVA, on perceptions of justice (Table 5). There was
only a significant main effect of level of disproportionality,
F(2,106) = 10.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34; post hoc comparisons
showed that perceptions of justice were significantly higher for
MD due to imbalance in inputs (M = 2.13) than those for either
the condition of MD due to imbalance in outcomes (M = 1.84,
p < 0.05) or the condition of SD (M = 1.60, p < 0.001). The
difference between the latter two conditions was not significant.
The theoretical explanation for this finding is that in cases of
disproportionality, equality in outcomes (as is the case in MDi)
renders the situation less unjust than other disproportional
situations. In all cases of disproportionality, however, the
situation was deemed unjust, since one-sample t-tests revealed
that all three means were significantly lower (p < 0.001) than the
midpoint of the scale (4), thus indicating perceptions of injustice,
a finding consistent with Hypothesis 2B.
Discussion
In study 1 we examined the effect of inputs and outcomes
on perceptions of receiving and justice in order to test our
hypotheses, which were formulated along the lines of equity
theory. Our main rationale was that equity theory ratios would
serve as the basis of perceptions of receiving – thereby revealing
the underlying attribution process of outcomes to inputs–, as
well as influence perceptions of justice in the absence of any
other information regarding the communication between the
hypothetical actors.
In conditions of balanced proportionality (i.e., inputs and
outcomes are equal) the perceptions of receiving and justice are
high. In conditions of imbalanced proportionality (imbalance
both in inputs and outcomes that cancels out), it seems as if
it were “every man for himself.” No one is really perceived to
receive from the other and this absence of influence is deemed
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TABLE 5 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of justice in conditions of disproportionality.
Disproportionality favorable to A Disproportionality favorable to B
SD MDi MDo SD MDi MDo
M 1.53 2.05 1.83 1.66 2.20 1.85
SD 0.77 1.13 1.12 1.22 1.23 1.03
SD, strong disproportionality; MDi, mild disproportionality due to imbalance in inputs; MDo, mild disproportionality due to imbalance in outcomes.
fair. We can argue that a proportional interdependent situation
will be perceived as exchange when it is balanced, probably
because balanced situations require coordination and some type
of exchange in order to be achieved. Otherwise, the situation
might not even be perceived as exchange, as outcomes will not
be attributed to inputs of other individuals. Moreover, and as we
expected on the basis of equity theory, proportional situations are
generally perceived as fair. However, it is notable that perceptions
of justice are higher when exchange is perceived to have taken
place, as exemplified in the balanced proportionality condition.
The results for disproportionality are a little less straight-
forward. There is definitely a sense of receiving in dispro-
portionality and it gets more intense as the disproportionality
gets stronger. This is consistent with expectations based on equity
ratios (Hypothesis 2A). Moreover, it is definitely perceived as
unjust for one party to receive more than the other (thereby
supporting Hypothesis 2B). However, perceptions of justice do
not follow the same pattern as that detected for receiving since
stronger disproportionality did not lead to higher perceptions
of injustice, which means that the level of perceived injustice
is not based adequately on equity theory ratios. In this case,
the most plausible explanation is that equality (i.e., balance in
outcomes) rather than equity was more salient in participants’
responses concerning the level of injustice in conditions of
disproportionality.
We have demonstrated that equity ratios are consistent with
perceptions of who receives more in a relationship; they appear
to serve as causal schemas, as indicated by the overall support
of our hypotheses. Judgment or evaluation of the exchange, as a
separate cognitive process, could on the other hand be the result
of the application of any rule or norm (in this case it involved both
an equity and an equality rule). The examination of this issue is
one of the primary aims of study 2.
STUDY 2: ARE INPUTS AND OUTCOMES
THE ONLY FACTOR IN THE EVALUATION
PROCESS?
The purpose of study 2 is twofold: To replicate the findings
of study 1 concerning disproportionality across three types of
interaction situations and further to examine if equity ratios
serve more as causal schemas of exchange than instruments of
justice evaluations. Our goal is to show that apart from the
cognitive process of attribution of outcomes, there is another
cognitive process that is responsible for the evaluation of the
situation as just, one that might not be captured at all by
equity theory. We propose that in cases of disproportionality,
although the favored person is perceived as having received, this
is not necessarily seen as unjust. We have already argued that
the evaluation process might involve the application of a rule
or norm that is agreed upon during reasoned communication.
Thus, a disproportional situation might be seen as just if there
is a communicatively rational rule pointing in that direction
or, more particularly, a reason for this disproportionality that
is validated by the agreement of the parties involved (a rule
that is reciprocally accepted by parties). More specifically, we
hypothesize that: In disproportional situations, irrespective of
input-outcome structure or the existence of agreement, the
favored party is perceived as having received (Hypothesis 3) but,
disproportionality will not be seen as unjust if it is rationally
agreed upon through reasoned communication (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants and Design
Sixty undergraduate psychology students voluntarily participated
in this study. The sample consisted of 16.6% males and 83.3%
females. Participants were between 18 and 38 years old with
a mean age of 20 years old (SD = 2.96), while all of them
were Caucasian. A 3 (games: chicken, prisoners’ dilemma,
assurance) × 2 (communication: no-agreement, agreement)
within-subjects design was used.
Procedure and Materials
Participants gave written consent after being informed of the
general purpose of the study, in line with the WMA declaration of
Helsinki. As in Study 1, no deception was employed and minimal
emotional involvement on the part of participants was expected.
The procedure was approved by the supervisory committee of the
Ph.D. thesis of the first author.
Participants were given a booklet containing three versions of
the story of A and B who are business partners, a story quite
similar to the one used in study 1. The three versions of the
story (variations involved the existence of a bonus or not, the
amount of work, the level of pay) reflected the utility structure
of three types of games, very common in game theory research
literature – chicken, prisoner’s dilemma, assurance (Poundstone,
1992). The prisoner’s dilemma concerns two prisoners offered a
Faustian bargain by the police to testify against each other and go
free. Game theory predicts that rational pursuit of self-interest
would result in both prisoners backstabbing each other (i.e.,
“defecting” instead of “cooperating”). Chicken, otherwise known
as hawk-dove, is modeled after the teenage game of highway
chicken where two drivers set their vehicles on collision course
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and the first one who swerves, loses. In this case, the rational
solution is not where both players defect, for that outcome
will result in their death; the rational solution is where one
player swerves (or “cooperates”) and the other drives straight
(or “defects”). Assurance, otherwise known as stag hunt, trust
dilemma or cooperation game, is not a real dilemma at all. All
parties prefer to cooperate and hunt a stag but the possibility
that someone might defect does not make catching the stag a
certainty. In this case, lack of trust or miscommunication might
make someone hunt a hare (i.e., “defect”) than hunt the stag (i.e.,
“cooperate”).
These games were chosen to illustrate different input-
outcome structures, which were presented by emphasizing A’s
and B’s structure of preferences (see Appendix), and to test
whether different strategies within each scenario would influence
perceptions of receiving or justice. The three games were
presented to participants in the aforementioned order. In both
prisoner’s dilemma and chicken, A and B (the characters in
the story) have an interest in deviating from a situation in
which they both work a lot (i.e., the situation in which they
“cooperate”). Only in the assurance game, the situation in which
they both work a lot is one they would not want to deviate
from. After receiving information on each version of the story,
participants were told that the eventual outcome of the story
was a disproportional one (favorable to B) in all three cases.
Each version was followed by items designed to obtain measures
for receiving (“I think that B ‘received’ from A”) and justice
(“I think that the situation is unjust”). Participants used a 7-
point scale to indicate their agreement or disagreement with
the items (7 for strong agreement, 1 for strong disagreement).
Participants responded to the same items under two conditions:
Under the premise that there is agreement that allowed for the
disproportionality for reasons regarding the personal relationship
of A and B (agreement condition) and under no such premise
(no-agreement condition). The agreement condition followed
the no-agreement condition – which essentially served as the
control – for each of the three games. It should be stressed
that in the agreement condition the story simply stated that the
outcome was due to “their agreement, supported by reasons that
had to do with their personal relationship” without mentioning
what those reasons could have been. In this way we made
agreement salient without mentioning what it might have
entailed, although noting that it was supported in the context of
their interaction2.
Results
Given the directional nature of the hypotheses, the relevant
tests are presented first, followed by further analysis using
a three (games: chicken, prisoners’ dilemma, assurance) × 2
(communication: no-agreement, agreement) within subjects
ANOVA (Table 6).
2It should be stressed that this experiment does not really compare distributive,
procedural, or interactional justice rules, but rather examines whether the existence
of any type of rule (even if it is never revealed) could serve as an explanation of
a seemingly unjust outcome (for example, by equity theory standards) once it is
mutually accepted by parties.
Receiving
One-sample t-tests revealed that, in all six conditions, means for
perceptions of B’s receiving were significantly higher (p < 0.001)
than the midpoint of the scale (4), indicating that participants
in all conditions perceived that the favored party B did
receive from A. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis
3. The ANOVA on perceptions of B’s receiving revealed a
significant main effect of games, F(2,118) = 5.98, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.09 and a significant main effect of communication,
F(1,59) = 8.11, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.12. However, these main
effects were qualified by a significant games × communication
interaction, F(2,118) = 4.93, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.08. The
breakdown of this interaction revealed the following: In the
no-agreement condition, perceptions of B’s receiving in the
assurance game condition (M = 4.78) were significantly lower
than those in both other conditions (M = 5.38, p < 0.001
for prisoners’ dilemma; M = 5.30, p < 0.01 for chicken),
while the latter two conditions did not differ significantly; this
game effect was not significant in the agreement condition. It
appears that perceptions of B’s receiving did not differ across
games when there was agreement on the disproportionality,
while they were higher in the prisoners’ dilemma and chicken
conditions when no agreement was mentioned. On the
whole, these findings lend further support to the findings
of study 1 concerning perceptions of receiving in cases of
disproportionality.
Injustice
One-sample t-tests revealed that, in the agreement condition,
means for perceptions of injustice for all three games were
significantly lower (p < 0.001) than the midpoint of the scale
(4), indicating low perceptions of injustice. These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 4. The ANOVA on perceptions
of injustice revealed a significant main effect of games,
F(2,118) = 3.24, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.05 and a significant
main effect of communication, F(1,59) = 72.99, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.55 showing that perceptions of injustice in the no-
agreement condition (M = 5.05) were significantly higher than
in the agreement condition (M = 3.35). However, these main
effects were qualified by a significant games × communication
interaction, F(2,118)= 6.69, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.10. The breakdown
of this interaction revealed the following: in the no-agreement
condition, perceptions of injustice for the assurance game
(M= 4.66) were significantly lower than those in both conditions
of prisoners’ dilemma (M = 5.25, p < 0.01) and chicken
(M= 5.23, p< 0.01), while the latter two conditions did not differ
significantly. In the agreement condition this game effect was not
significant.
To sum up, it appears that perceptions of injustice differ
across the communication conditions. Once there is agreement
(a reciprocally accepted rule) on the disproportionality, the
situation is no longer seen as unjust (although it is perceived that
B still receives from A, as we saw in the analysis of receiving).
It is worth noting, however, that in the no-agreement condition,
perceptions of injustice are lower in the assurance game (which is
consistent with the perception that B receives less in the assurance
game), a finding which will be further discussed.
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TABLE 6 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of B’s receiving and injustice.
No-agreement Agreement
Chicken PD Assurance Chicken PD Assurance
B’s receiving M 5.30 5.38 4.78 4.75 4.90 4.73
SD 1.13 1.12 1.34 1.27 1.10 1.36
Injustice M 5.23 5.25 4.66 3.41 3.25 3.38
SD 1.37 1.43 1.42 1.48 1.43 1.51
Discussion
In study 2 we examined participants’ perceptions of receiving
and injustice for a disproportional outcome in an interdependent
situation across three types of games and under two conditions
of agreement and no-agreement on this disproportionality. In
the case of the existence of agreement within the relationship,
disproportionality was not seen as unjust across all three
types of games. This runs counter to equity-based expectations
concerning perceptions of justice. At the same time, perceptions
of receiving were in line with equity-based expectations about
attributions and were the same across all three types of games.
In other words, it can be argued that individuals use equity ratios
to attribute outcomes and understand patterns of receiving but
use norms and terms that evoke rational agreement in order to
understand justice.
Although our purpose was to distinguish between agreement
(as the only factor affecting perceptions of justice) and the
structure of inputs-outcomes (as the only factor affecting
perceptions of receiving), we have to acknowledge that there is
a relationship between perceptions of receiving and perceptions
of agreement, as operationalized, measured and tested in the
above study. The interaction between agreement and input-
outcome structures shows that agreement can be treated as
the main objective of communicative rationality mechanisms
(as we intended) but can also be treated as something you
give or take from other people, just like a promise or a favor
or indeed, any type of resource. This would account for the
finding that, where explicit agreement was absent (no agreement
condition), perceptions of receiving were higher in games
(Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken Game) where hypothetical
actors appeared to consciously deviate from implicit agreements
of “cooperation”–thus receiving more from their exchange
counterparts-. In the assurance game though, where each of the
hypothetical actors had no way of knowing what the other would
do and thus there was no hint of implicit agreement that was
“violated,” perceptions of receiving were lower. This is useful to
point out since treating agreement in this way is equivalent to
considering agreement as another type of resource that weighs in
with regard to attribution processes rather than treating it as the
ultimate criterion for the appropriateness of norms and justice
considerations.
Despite small differences in perceptions of receiving,
disproportionality does create perceptions of receiving across
all types of games and conditions of agreement. From then on,
perceptions of justice may be based on the usual type of rules: that
of “giving to every man his own” (Hobbes, 1996, p. 96). This is
the exact pattern that we saw in the no-agreement condition. On
the other hand, perceptions of justice can be based on reasoning
such as “Elderly people should receive more” or “Women should
be paid less” (Moore, 2006) or, indeed, on any rules that can
be supported in reasoned discussion, even if they point toward
disproportionality and inequity. Equity theory alone cannot
account for perceptions of justice – and consequently, for the
findings in the agreement condition. It is evident that in study 2,
an explicitly reciprocally accepted rule influenced perceptions of
justice substantially. Moreover, these basic conclusions seem to
generalize across all types of interactions (illustrated in this study
by the different types of games). This means that independent
of the utility structure of any interaction, people will perceive
the direction of the give-and-take on the basis of the attribution
of outcomes but will judge what is just or not, according to the
potential communicatively rational agreement on the rules they
see relevant. The present findings seem to provide initial support
for our contention that there are two distinct cognitive processes
in social exchange: one concerning the attribution of outcomes
and another pertaining to the evaluation of the situation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Social exchange theory can study how people affect each
other by the use of their resources, which can broadly be
defined as behavioral capabilities (Emerson, 1981), and in
this way explain a wealth of social psychological phenomena,
especially in the organizational context where behavior is
often treated as part of an exchange process. In this paper
we have demonstrated that situations of interdependence can
often be perceived as give-and-take situations. On the basis
of a causal schema that treats inputs as causes and outcomes
as effects, we proposed that people attribute outcomes of a
social interaction either to their own or to other people’s
inputs and further argued that, when they attribute outcomes
to the inputs of other people, they treat an interaction as
exchange. Not all situations are necessarily treated as exchange
though. Our findings indicate that an imbalanced proportionality
situation, that is, a situation where the equity ratios are
equal without inputs or outcomes being equal at the same
time, it is “every man for himself ”: People do not seem to
attribute their own outcomes to the inputs of other people.
On the other hand, situations of disproportionality or balanced
proportionality create strong perceptions of receiving from one
another.
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Equity ratios therefore represent a causal schema that appears
rudimentary in an ‘interaction as exchange’ situation. This
type of approach offers great potential in understanding how
people attribute outcomes to possible underlying exchanges.
Let’s for example take the outcome of John’s high employee
performance: Attributing the performance to his own good
skills may weaken the perception of John receiving from Jane,
his fellow employee. On the other hand, in a closed system
of a two employees’ unit, an assumption that John has low
skills leads to the attribution of the ‘high performance’ outcome
to inputs from Jane, which in turn implicitly points to an
underlying exchange on the basis of the disproportionality of
the situation. At the same time, a multiple necessary input-
outcome schema (see Kelley, 1972) can lead to the conclusion
that John both has good skills and has received from fellow
employees. If both John and Jane have high performance and
high skills and on the basis of our research findings, we
will predict that the business interaction between John and
Jane will be perceived as exchange, since it is a balanced
proportional situation. On the other hand, if John has low
performance and low skills, whereas Jane has high performance
and high skills, the situation will most likely not be perceived
as exchange. Indeed equity ratios can serve as a causal schema
that can be applied in many social exchange situations and
in many different ways that can be predicted by attribution
theory.
Inputs and outcomes by themselves cannot determine
how people will judge the situation once they perceive it
as exchange, contrary to what equity theory might suggest.
On the basis of our findings it seems legitimate to suggest
that people are able to make judgments through rules,
norms, values, terms that can be supported within the
context of reasoned communication leading to agreement.
Although not all real-life agreements necessarily validate
the rightness of norms and especially those that determine
justice evaluations, it was shown that agreement can serve
as a strong criterion for evaluating a situation as just, even
in the absence of any other information concerning an
interaction. This finding underlines the importance people place
on agreement among individuals in evaluating the fairness
of any situation. By accepting the broader conception of
communicative rationality and contrasting it with instrumental
rationality (Habermas, 1985), we can approach exchange
situations and the different criteria (distributive, procedural,
interactional, deontic) for evaluating the situation by focusing
on a cognitive process that essentially tests the validity
of any norm through the examination of what would be
reasonable during communication. In the previous example
of John and Jane, any type of arrangement will be judged
according to what would appear reasonable in rational discussion
and in the end, according to what would elicit agreement.
Therefore proportional outcomes might be judged as unfair or
disproportional outcomes as fair, according to communicative
rationality mechanisms.
The two studies presented can be seen as a first attempt
in assessing equity ratios as causal schemas and as such
they have some limitations. Firstly, we only used a ‘closed’
system of two actors in which no other factors really played
a role in the outcome of the exchange. We excluded third
factors that might be incorporated through the presence
of other actors or environmental factors such as chance.
Needless to say that a factor such as chance (for chance
attributions see Rotter et al., 1962; cf. Friedland, 1992)
would arguably make the attribution of outcomes to the
inputs of other people less probable and consequently the
perception that exchange took place weaker. Secondly, we
used a third-person perspective in order to examine pure
cognitive processes that were as basic as possible, but
it would be interesting to examine these processes from
the viewpoint of participants in more ‘open’ exchange
situations, either in the laboratory or in real life, especially
when they are actively involved. It has been shown that
people perform justice evaluations in a self-serving manner
(De Dreu, 1996) or that taking the perspective of other
exchange participants reduces enjoyment for high credit
claimers (Epley et al., 2006). Reciprocation in kind is also
subject to egocentric interpretations of the exchange process
(Zhang and Epley, 2009). It would be useful to further
examine how instrumentally rational considerations influence
communicatively rational perceptions since, arguably, any
type of judgment is often put to the test of a dialectic
process, even if it is self-interested (see Arvanitis and
Karampatzos, 2011). Finally, we examined the use of positive
resources, but the study of negative resources would be equally
important.
In this paper, we have attempted to distinguish between the
cognitive processes of attribution and evaluation in an exchange
situation. We have generally supported our general contention
that attribution and evaluation can be distinguished as different
cognitive processes. Further exploration as to how these two
cognitive processes are exactly linked could be potentially useful
in understanding more about other processes such as prescriptive
attributions (Gollan and Witte, 2008) and in offering links among
social exchange theory, equity theory, psychological contract
theory and communicative rationality mechanisms.
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